# No DMARC policy found

> A domain with no enforced DMARC policy can be forged by anyone. Why that matters when an invoice asks you to change bank details.

Canonical: https://vetthisvendor.com/guide/no-dmarc-policy
Published: 2026-08-02. Updated: 2026-08-02.
Author: Jose Pollman, VetThisVendor.

If the sending-domain check reported **no enforced DMARC policy**, it means anyone on the
internet can send email that appears to come from that domain, and receiving mail servers
have not been told to reject it.

## Why this sits next to a VAT check

Most invoice fraud does not involve a fake company. It involves a real supplier,
a real invoice, and changed bank details — delivered by an email that appears to come
from the supplier's own domain.

That email is convincing precisely because the domain is genuine. A registry check will
pass. The company exists, the VAT number is valid, the trading relationship is real. The
only thing wrong is the account number, and the only technical signal available in
advance is whether that domain could have been forged in the first place.

## The three records, and what each does

- **SPF** lists which servers may send mail for the domain. On its own it is advisory —
  it says what *should* happen, not what receivers must do.
- **DKIM** signs messages cryptographically, so tampering is detectable.
- **DMARC** is the instruction that gives the other two teeth. It tells receiving servers
  what to do when a message fails those checks.

Without DMARC, a forged message that fails SPF may still land in the inbox.

## Reading the policy

| Policy | What receivers do | What it means for you |
|---|---|---|
| `p=reject` | Forged mail is refused outright | Strongest. Forgery is largely prevented |
| `p=quarantine` | Forged mail goes to spam | Good. Forgery usually does not reach the inbox |
| `p=none` | Nothing — the domain only collects reports | **No protection.** Monitoring mode only |
| *no record* | Nothing | **No protection** |

`p=none` is the one that catches people out. The domain has a DMARC record, so a
superficial check reports "DMARC: yes", but it instructs receivers to do nothing at all.
This tool reports it as unenforced, because that is what it is.

## What to do

**If this is your supplier:** treat any request to change bank details from this domain
with particular caution. Do not reply to the email to confirm — if the mailbox is
compromised, or the message was forged, you are confirming with the fraudster. Phone a
number you already had.

**If this is your own domain:** you can fix it. Publish SPF and DKIM, then add a DMARC
record starting at `p=none` to collect reports, and move to `p=quarantine` and then
`p=reject` once those reports show your legitimate mail passing. The sibling tool at
[notspoofed.com](https://notspoofed.com) walks through exactly this and generates the
records for you.

## What it does not tell you

An enforced DMARC policy means the domain is hard to forge. It does not mean the mailbox
was not compromised — an attacker sending from inside a real account passes every one of
these checks. Confirming bank details by phone remains the control that catches it.
